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The idea that France is the striking illustration of what multiculturalism is not
(Jennings  2000), or that, to the contrary, the Netherlands and Britain have epit-
omized a European version of multiculturalism (Hentzinger 2003) has been held
as self-evident wisdom by scholars, journalists, politicians, and ordinary citizens at
least since the 1980s. Who would challenge the existence of contradictions among
French republican assimilation, British race relations, or Dutch pillarization? Such
differences have been stylized into national models. For a long time, these models
have sparked strong interest in international social science literature. Models were
used to account for national idiomatic integration policies, the structure of public
discourses, processes of immigrants’ socio-economic and socio-cultural incor poration,
and the reaction of European societies to immigration, race, ethnicity, and so forth
(for a recent illustration, see Fetzer and Soper 2005). 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, these traditional
models began to go into crisis. The British and Dutch versions of multiculturalism
were publicly declared failures, and French republicanism was portrayed as going
through a profound crisis, mainly after the 2005 riots (Fassin and Fassin 2006).
In the wake of these new discourses, Islam was dramatized as a challenge to lib-
eral democracy and national identity; integration and citizenship were framed as
institutional and symbolic sites of a cultural conflict —if not a clash of civiliza-
tions— and immigrants as the main agents of the crisis. While they attempted to
explain this crisis, scholars who had been confident until then in the existence of
stylized models of citizenship became embarrassed. How could the “crisis of models”
that burst through in the 2000s be explained with the classical notion of “models” that
had been so useful to them before? 
Scholars tried to overcome this embarrassment, pointing to different possible
explanations. Some speculated about the possible convergence among Western
European countries’ integration policies, and the crisis of models was conceived of as
the indicator of a retreat from classical versions of multiculturalism and republica nism
in favor of coercive integration coupled with anti-discrimination measures (Joppke
2007; Wallace Goodman 2010). Others pointed to the lack of flexibility, adapta-
tion, or pragmatism of traditional conceptions of citizenship, at a time of increasing
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socio-cultural and religious diversity; models were much too path-dependent to adapt
easily to new problems, and produced “pathologies” in public discourses and policies
(Amiraux 2010; Guiraudon 2006; Favell 1998). Finally, some scholars presented
the uniqueness of Islam as the main agent of the crisis; that is, classical approaches
to citizenship and integration were not appropriate anymore in the face of such an
unprecedented challenge (Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2005). 
I contend that these analyses help us make sense of the European anti-Islam
and anti-immigrant politics that took the form of a “multicultural backlash” in the
decade from 2000 to 2010 (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). I argue that these
new discourses are not merely a political puzzle that scholars must address but an
epistemological challenge that calls for a critical reappraisal of notions long
held as appropriate and relevant in the scholarship, such as “national models of
integration.”
This is what I propose we do in this article, by answering the following ques-
tion: Can “models of integration” help us explain the scenario of their crisis that
seems to weigh so heavily in the explanations of new anti-immigrant and anti-Islam
public discourses? My answer is that this is not the case, because the notion of
models is strongly biased and ill-founded. Models are a preconceived notion rather
than a genuine analytical framework, which scholars cannot use without their
research paying considerable costs. However, one should not throw the baby out
with the bathwater and discard models entirely. Instead, we can think about them
in a way that is more useful for the social sciences.
The Crisis of National Models of Integration: 
A New Stage of Anti-Immigrant Discourses
On October 16, 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “the approach
[to building] a multicultural [society] and to liv[ing] side-by-side and enjoy[ing]
each other... has failed, utterly failed” (Die Welt 2010). Only a few months later, on
February 5, 2011, the newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron chal-
lenged the United Kingdom’s multicultural integration policies, and connected
multiculturalism to radical Islamism. He declared, “Instead of ignoring this ex tre mist
ideology, we —as governments and societies— have got to confront it. Instead of
encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity,
open to everyone” (Wright and Taylor 2011). Eventually, the president of the French
Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, asked during a February 10, 2011, TV talk show what
he thought about the question of immigrant integration, answered, “Yes, multicul -
turalism is a failure. In all our democracies, we have paid too much attention to the
identity of the [immigrants] who arrived in France, and not enough to the identity of
the country” (Libération 2011). 
It would, of course, be hazardous to assign to “multiculturalism” any consis-
tent definition that would encompass the differences among the national contexts
of reference in these discourses. However, these anti-multicultural contentions
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participate in a new framing of integration issues in the public and political debates,
most salient since the 2000s.
This framing superimposes several repertoires. It focuses strictly on Islam as
the main challenge to citizenship and the values of liberalism. The issue is heavily cul-
turalized, and socio-economic dimensions disappear from the dominant frames
about the “problems of integration.” Gender and sexual equality are major instru-
mental references in these debates about the incommensurability of Islam and
Western liberal citizenship. 
Another aspect is that extreme right-wing parties do not monopolize these stra -
tegic discourses about Islam and Muslims. Of course, they have a massive im pact
on the definition of the agenda in countries like the Netherlands or France. Populist
movements and public figures such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders have played
key roles in the emergence of anti-multicultural discourses since 2002. However,
the debate started a decade before, initiated by the liberal leader Fritz Bolkenstein
as early as 1991, and was visible in discussions among Social-De mo crats. The pu b -
lication of an article by Paul Scheffer in 2000 on “the multicultural tragedy” and
the 2002 murder of Theo Van Gogh sparked a new debate, in which the Dutch mul -
ticultural integration model that had supposedly been implemented in the 1980s
was accused of being the main reason for the “tragedy.” 
The situation in France in the present decade is another cause for concern.
A March 2011 poll forecast that Marine Le Pen, the president of the French
extreme right-wing National Front party, could be in first place in the first round of
the 2012 presidential elections, with 23 percent of the votes, compared to 21 per-
cent for Nicolas Sarkozy and 21 percent for the leader of the Socialist Party (Le
Monde 2011). This is a direct outcome of the politics of French secularism, Islam,
and immigra tion since 2002, which accelerated after the 2007 presidential elec-
tion and the creation of a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Iden tity.
In a July 2010 public speech in Grenoble, Nicolas Sarkozy (2010) stated that
the French re publican model was failing because of “30 years of uncontrolled
immigration.”
How can we analyze this situation? As mentioned above, the literature has been
increasingly concerned with this so-called “crisis of integration” connected to a
“crisis of identities.” In turn, this identity crisis has been framed as a problem of
the competition between, on the one hand, national conceptions of citizenship
and, on the other hand, collective identity claims made by migrants in general and
“Muslims” in particular (Joppke 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). And countries like
France, Germany, Britain, or the Netherlands have been held up as laboratories
of this “crisis” by scholars committed to demonstrating the comparative advan-
tages of the various “national models” they identified in each national context:
that is, republicanism for France (Favell 1998), ethno-nationalism for Germany
(Brubaker 1992), and multiculturalism for the Netherlands or Britain (Koopmans
et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2005; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).
Underlying the crisis of traditional models of citizenship, some authors have argued
about a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship and a retreat from
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multiculturalism (Joppke 2004, 2007). Others, on the contrary, argue that these
national models are strongly path-dependent (Schain, 2008) and that France
remains a powerful illustration of what multiculturalism is not, while in countries
like Britain or the Netherlands, multiculturalism remains something indisputably
un-French (see Jennings 2000). 
What this scholarship shares in common is the idea that “national integration
models” would be a useful framework for the comparative study of citizenship.
From this perspective, nothing could be understood about immigrants and mi -
norities in France outside a narrative that identifies republicanism as the French
model, or British “race relations” and the Dutch “multiculturalism” as national mod-
els for Britain and the Netherlands.
Instead of these understandings, I think the real cause for concern that soci-
ologists, historians, or political scientists should be aware of is less about this “crisis
of national models” that attracts so much attention in the literature, than the ina -
bility of this literature to provide us with a viable definition of these models as
analytical frameworks. In other words, the scholarly notions of a British and Dutch
multiculturalism —and, for similar reasons, of a French republicanism— are pro b -
lematic because they are also used by other non-scholarly agents, who have
structured the public and political debates along the idea of models and their crises.
My point here is that models are not simply a neutral tool social scientists use when
they work on immigrant integration. They are also part of the public and political
discourses about immigrant integration, and an argument in the new public dis-
courses against immigration and Islam. It is thus difficult to use an analytical frame -
work that participates actively in the construction of the puzzling reality it propo -
ses to analyze. This leads us to confront the notion of models and assess its virtues
and drawbacks. 
Key Problems with Models
A national model of integration and citizenship is usually defined as a public phi-
losophy (Schain 2008), a policy paradigm (Favell 1998; Guiraudon 2006), an insti -
tutional and discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans et al. 2005), or a nation-
al cultural idiom (Brubaker 1992). All these concepts attempt to show how social
reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about a nation’s self-understanding (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hall 1993; Müller 2005; Goffman 1974; Skocpol 1985).1
Within this perspective, France is conceived as an assimilationist country (as
opposed to multiculturalist countries like Britain or the Netherlands), whose na -
tional identity is based on a universalistic public philosophy (as opposed to an
ethno-cultural national identity, as in the case in Germany). In turn, because France
is a republican country, its notion of the Republic is seen as all-encompassing: the
Republic organizes the separation between public and private realms (through a
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1 The following sections were first published in Bertossi (2011).
strict color-blind approach to ethnicity and race), between the state and the church
(the philosophy of French secularism, laïcité), and it underpins the specifically
French “political, open definition” of citizenship and immigrant incorporation through
nationality (for a summary of all these interrelated dimensions of the French
model, see Schnapper 1994a). By contrast, in Britain and the Netherlands, diffe r -
ent idealistic structures are viewed as enabling people to mobilize on the basis of
ethnic or racial identities, while integration policies aim at promoting group-based
identities instead of a common citizenship (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007;
Koopmans and Statham 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 2009). 
This perspective on integration models emphasizes first that agency and col-
lective interests are marginal dimensions of institutional arrangements (in the field of
education or health, for example) and the structure of public debates (Brubaker
1992, 13-16; Bleich 2003). Instead, normative and idealistic “frames,” “structures,”
“idioms,” or “paradigms” are seen as being the primary and main driving force of
policies and practices related to identity, citizenship, immigration, religious diver-
sity, and so on. Social actors, from politicians to veiled Muslim women, are portrayed
as simply inheriting these ideas, using and adapting to them. In turn, a public speech
on immigrants or a woman’s decision to wear the hijab are also brought down to
a single cause, namely the power of French republicanism or British and Dutch
multiculturalism to drive individual behavior, social movements, institutional
arrangements, and policies (Koopmans et al. 2005; Favell 1998; Schnapper 1994b). 
When it comes to explaining precisely how this causal relation works and where
these models come from, however, the literature is unclear. Assumptions about
the aprioristic existence of a French republic, which supposedly started on July 14,
1789, and ended on October 11, 2010, with the prohibition of the niqab, are com-
mon, as are assumptions about the Dutch and British multicultural models. But
a convincing explanation for the origins of these models and why they are empha-
sized in public discourse and policy is never offered. The notion of a national model
is held as self-evident. It provides an account of a social world with no agency but
a top-down elite-driven structure (see Mathieu 2002), with no real historicity —no
substantial difference is seen between France’s republican identity in 1789, under
the Third Republic, or today— but a strong path dependency —French republicanism
and British and Dutch multiculturalism cannot easily be replaced by other con-
ceptions— and in which ideas have paramount power. It gives no detailed account
of where these ideas get their power from, or the processes and mechanisms through
which they shape social reality and are accepted and used by social actors in dif-
ferent contexts. In other words, in order to accept the relevance of the notion of na -
tional models, one also has to accept as a given the pre-existence of national public
philosophies with sufficient influence to shape a whole society.
Another problem is that the notion of a model of integration and citizenship
used by scholars is borrowed from the discourse of a variety of stakeholders in po -
litical, media, and academic spheres. Analytical ideal types of French republican-
ism or British and Dutch multiculturalism are akin to political stereotypes, com-
monly held in public and political debates in each country. When sociologists,
ANTI-IMMIGRANT POLITICS 383
political scientists, historians, or philosophers discuss republican or multicultural
models, they are not writing about anything different from what politicians and jour-
nalists talk and write about, even if scholars —sometimes— discuss the models in
a different way. The notion of model used by scholars is heteronomous: academ-
ic discussions on models are pervaded by normative, political, and moral interests
that stem from ideological debates in the public arena in which scholars also take part
(Bowen 2007; Scholten 2009; Essed and Nimako 2006; Bertossi and Duyvendak
2009). The problem here is the extent to which scholarly notions of integration
models reflect and are influenced by public debates, which in turn are structured by
dominant and elite-shaped frames. Often, scholarly writings presented as analyzing
social and political phenomena are heavily normative. This normative dimension is
strikingly obvious in the literature that has addressed the issue of a possible “crisis”
of national integration models in Europe since the begin ning of the 2000s (Vertovec
and Wessendorf 2009). Research on the integration of immigrants in Europe has
turned into discussions about the success or failure of traditional integration poli-
cies on the one hand, and on the other, about the legitimacy of ethnic minorities’
claims, particularly those made by Muslims (Joppke 2007, 2009; Koopmans and
Statham 2005; Klausen 2005). By the same token, these debates have reinforced
questions about Muslims’ loyalty and incorporation —“Are they with us or against
us?”— and the relevance of a category (“Muslims”) that is used in and is the subject
of political debates. 
Finally, the notion of an integration and citizenship model has a totalizing ten -
dency: it tends to bundle together social, institutional, and political facets of cit-
izenship and the integration of migrants, treating these different aspects as a “cul-
tural totality” (Foucault 1969, 25), even when scholarly discussions of models are
nuanced. For instance, scholars commonly point to the contradictions, inconsis-
tencies, and limits of the republican model in France or of multiculturalism in the
Netherlands and Britain. What is usually assumed, however, and not questioned,
is that France has a republication model or that the Netherlands has represented
the ideal type of a European form of institutional and normative multiculturalism.
This common acceptance of a French republican or a Dutch multicultural model
in the social science literature hinders our understanding of diversity and inte-
gration in two ways. 
First, discussions of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, or the integration
problems of a variety of immigrant groups in a country tend to be limited to con -
siderations of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different mod-
els. The research questions thus become: Does French republicanism produce
more or less discrimination than Dutch and British multiculturalism? Does the
former integrate immigrants better than the latter (Koopmans et al. 2005; Favell
1998; Schain 2008; Brubaker 1992)?
The precise meanings of the republican and multicultural models are often
forgotten in such discussions. Of course, republicanism and multiculturalism refer
to clear normative systems in the writings of political philosophers (Laborde 2010;
Pettit 1997; Guérard de Latour 2010). But it is far from certain that these systems
384 CHRISTOPHE BERTOSSI
ANTI-IMMIGRANT POLITICS 385
provide manageable and relevant frameworks of analysis for social and political
scientists looking at institutions and social interactions in different national con-
texts. As mentioned above, the assumption that models are an independent variable
that can account for the socio-cultural and socio-economic integration of immi -
grants and minority groups leaves partially unanswered the question of how nor-
mative systems are translated into a complex institutional and social reality, and
how they affect policies and the functioning of institutions such as schools, hos-
pitals, the military, or the labor market. Of particular concern is the reification of the
models, even when they are addressed within a frame analysis perspective inspired by
Goffman (1974) (for a formulation of the reification issue, see Mathieu [2002]; for
an illustration of the problem, Passy and Guigni [2005]). The ideological or symbol-
ic dimensions of the incorporation of migrants or minority groups are reified into
models, which serve, for certain scholars, as legitimate substitutes for in-depth
research and analysis of empirical reality.
Secondly, this tendency affects the selection of and the analytical importance
placed on various indicators that scholars use to understand differences among
national contexts. It is not uncommon for scholars to derive their indicators from
their a priori and reified notion in order to prove that these very models exist. For
example, Muslim chaplaincies in prisons or in the military have been presented as
proof of multiculturalism in the Netherlands (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2005, 156).
However, such institutional roles are perceived as either irrelevant or “pathological”
within the French context since it is difficult to argue that Muslim chaplains in
the French armed forces or prisons prove that France is a multicultural country
(on the notion of “pathologies” in national philosophies of citizenship, see Favell
[1998]; on ethnicity in the French military and prisons, Bertossi and Wihtol de
Wenden [2007]; Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar [2005]). 
This example not only raises the “one-country-one-indicator” issue in com-
parative research, but also shows that other possible independent variables can be
lost in the analysis through the use of preconceived national models. The fact is
that the shift from conscription to an all-volunteer military (i.e., the specific insti-
tutional logic) has played a more important role in the implementation of Muslim
chaplaincies in the French military than the general conception of French citizen -
ship. Finally, this example also demonstrates the tendency of models to strikingly
limit the predictive potential usually attributed to them: the French color-blind
model of citizenship cannot predict the institutionalization of cultural accommo-
dation in a public institution like the military (for a similar argument about poli-
cies, see Wallace Goodman [2010]). 
In the end, the question concerning national models is empirical: when scholars
go into the field to conduct research, how can they make sense of the behavior
and attitudes of people who justify their actions using notions like the “republic,”
“secularism,” “integration,” “multiculturalism,” “pillarization,” “ethnicity,” “Islam,” or
“race”? I argue that, taken as a comprehensive analytical framework and indepen -
dent variable, models of integration are not much use in answering this question, for
all the reasons mentioned above. 
In the next two sections, I propose to look at these key reasons in context.
That is, I suggest that we need to observe how the notion of models has been used in
recent discussions about the incorporation of immigrants and minority groups
in Western European countries. Interestingly enough, these discussions have in -
creasingly focused on a so-called “crisis” or “failure” of traditional integration models
in France, Britain, and the Netherlands.
French Scholarly Politics of Republicanism: 
Debating the Model or Modeling the Debate?
The current debate about republicanism among French scholars has highlighted
the political power of the contradictions between the republican ideal of color-
blind equality, supposedly at the source of the French integration policies, and the
actual discrimination suffered by immigrants and their offspring, and their stigma -
tization in public and political debates as members of racial and ethnic groups (De
Rudder et al. 2000; Fassin and Fassin 2006). One key topic of these debates has
concerned the use of “ethnic categories” to assess the level of racial and ethnic dis -
crimination (Sabbagh and Peer 2008). The dilemma hinges on considering these
categories as a breach of the traditional color-blind republican approach to citi-
zenship —the French state does not formally recognize ethnic or racial groups—
or, conversely, considering the color-blind approach an impediment to an in-depth
understanding of the extent and nature of discrimination against French minori-
ty group members, a discrimination that contradicts the principle of republican
equality (Martiniello and Simon 2005; Simon 2003). This discussion of ethnic
categories has not been limited to the question of the state’s use of ethnic cate-
gories in the national census. It has focused on the legitimacy of their use by social
scientists researching integration in France; this is a burning issue in France,
which has nothing to do with the legitimate questions involved in scientific dis-
course and everything to do with the ideological nature of public debates (Simon
and Amiraux 2006).
This debate over the use of ethnic categories reveals two mutually exclusive
conceptions of the French model. For those against using ethnic categories, the
immense value of French republicanism is that it emancipates individuals through
its specific universalistic program, despite actual discrimination. By refusing any
reference to ethnicity in research on integration and citizenship, many authors call
for preserving this fundamental value (Schnapper 1994a, 1994b). They criticize
fellow scholars for using ethnic and racial categories in their research, sometimes
accusing them of “creating” ethnic groups in France (Pierrot 1998, 235). Those
in favor of adopting ethnic categories argue that the color-blindness of the French
model impedes efforts to improve the status of ethnic and racial minority group
members and reduce the discrimination they suffer, and that this model must be
corrected in order to restore its initial value, upholding the motto of “liberty, equa l -
ity, fraternity” (Weil 2005; Laborde 2010; Guérard de Latour 2010).
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Regardless of the way in which French scholars approach the question of eth-
nic categories, they do share a similar conception of the value of republicanism:
that is, republicanism is the model France has inherited from her political tradi-
tion, and it stands, compared to other models, as the best ideological and policy
framework to incorporate migrants and minority groups into French society. The
existence of a singular French model remains undisputed. Scholars who criticize
the contradictions and costs of republicanism nonetheless continue to accept or
assume what I would call an imagined normative republic, characterized by abstract
universalism, individual equality, and state neutrality in matters of religion. The
French model, in other words, is at once a product of wishful thinking, a norma-
tive position, and an analytical framework. 
Finally, such debates concern not only French academics or students. They
have an impact of their own on the international literature for various reasons:
French scholars’ work is read outside of France; French scholars are often the first
interviewees that foreign —junior as well as senior— researchers meet in their initial
days of research in France; and French scholars are also involved in writing public
or policy-oriented documents (Scholten 2009) or articles in newspapers that often
end up on the desks of international academics and are used in analyzing the
French situation. This circulation of French debates outside the boundaries of the
republic contributes to reinforcing the belief in the existence of the French model,
in the form of wishful thinking, a normative stand, or a useful analytical framework
that helps explain the idiomatic approach used in France when it comes to mi -
grants and minority groups.
More generally, what this example of French scholarly debates shows is that
we cannot break with a discourse that turns unique national characteristics into
a normative and explicative model simply by pointing out its contradictions. Quite
the opposite. By discussing the model, we end up —reluctantly?— confirming its
existence even if the discussion of its principles is nuanced. Debating republicanism
does not explain what the republican model is. This leaves the field researcher
without a specific answer to our initial question: Does a national integration and
citizenship model exist that explains observed reality?
Debates on the European “Multicultural Backlash”: 
A New Normative Turn 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the question of models has taken a specific turn
in public debates in Western Europe, reinforcing their normative power in the
academic literature. The difference between multiculturalism and republicanism,
a difference long considered a major element in citizenship policies, is less sharp
than it used to be (Joppke 2007). A “backlash” seems to have emerged against multi -
culturalism in the Netherlands and Britain (for a critique of backlash arguments,
see Vertovec and Wessendorf [2009]). Some authors, arguing against the conception
of strongly path-dependent models, have addressed this multicultural backlash by
describing a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship, and a retreat
from multiculturalism in favor of a new “civic integration” approach (Joppke 2004,
2007; Wallace Goodman 2010). 
A pivotal notion of the convergence hypothesis is multiculturalism’s failure to
integrate Muslims. For example, Christian Joppke emphasizes the “puzzling dis-
junction between an apparently ill-adapted and dissatisfied Muslim minority and
a rather accommodative state policy” in Britain (2009, 455), and concludes that
“the most deceptive and pernicious [wrong things to expect from the state] perhaps
are ‘respect and recognition’” (2009, 470). Interestingly, authors who emphasize
the path-dependent dimension of national models seem to share this view when
it comes to criticizing multiculturalism as a form of “segregationism” (Koopmans
et al. 2005, 11). In their comparison of Muslim collective claims in Britain and
the Netherlands, Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham emphasize the singularity of
Muslim groups. They argue that, in contrast to other groups, “Muslims based in
the Netherlands dare to demand new group exceptions in a dynamic way” (2005,
155) in the public arena and that “claims made by certain ethnic minority groups
are less easy to satisfy because they bring into question the very essence of liber-
al values” (2005, 140).
This discussion on the limits of multiculturalism in Britain and the Netherlands
calls for two comments. First, the argument of a multicultural backlash appears mere-
ly as a stylized replication of political discourses. This argument is similar to the new
politics of anti-multiculturalism that has emerged in Britain and the Netherlands
since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2004, Trevor Phillips, then-pre sident of the
British Commission for Racial Equality, explained that “multicul turalism is a solu-
tion of the past….It implies separation” (Times 2004). The statement had a strong
echo within the heated debate on the future of British multiculturalism that had
begun few years before (Parekh 2000; Barry 2001) in Britain and in other Euro -
pean countries. In the Netherlands, Paul Scheffer’ article on “The Multicultural
Tragedy” (2000) generated considerable public discussion about the failure of the
Dutch multicultural model, and, among other things, provided legitimacy to radical
critiques of Dutch immigrant integration policies (see, among others, Duyvendak
and Scholten [2009]).
Second, spurred by this new debate, scholars have become engrossed in the
attempt to understand the much-announced crisis of the Dutch and British mod-
els, and the reasons for the failure of multiculturalism. Regardless of the way they
look at the multicultural backlash (from a convergence or a path-dependency per-
spective), many authors use national multicultural integration models as an inde-
pendent variable for explaining the multicultural crisis. In doing so, they strengthen
the notion’s normative dimension, which is increasingly connected to the predo m -
inant political and public debates on the issue. It also reinforces the apparently
obvious existence of a causal relationship between national models, policy devel-
opments, and collective mobilizations in a national context, without clarifying def-
initions of the models, or assessing their power to make sense of empirical reality.
This has given rise to a striking paradox: never have we taken for granted so indis-
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putably the analytical usefulness of these models than since we started discussing
their crisis, failure, or end. 
The Elusiveness of Models
Despite the problems with models that I have mentioned, the fact is that the notion
of national models can still be useful for the comparative study of immigrant inte-
gration on the condition that what scholars construct as national frameworks re -
flects empirical reality, including instances where the constructs are an official
version of this reality. In other words, in order to conduct a debate on the heuristic
values of republicanism or multiculturalism as models of a given country, we ought
to be able to extract a sufficiently stable definition of French republicanism or of
multiculturalism in the Netherlands or Britain as normative value systems to be
able to use the models as explanatory tools. 
However, the normative consistency of national integration models becomes
difficult to grasp when we look back at the last three decades of politics and pub-
lic policies of integration in the Netherlands, Britain, and France. Indeed, the de -
bates on republicanism and multiculturalism seem to act as a fig leaf hiding the
widely varied and contradictory framings of integration and citizenship issues in
each country.
In the Netherlands, the idea of a multicultural model has had a complex tra-
jectory.2 The integration of migrants was not a public issue until the late 1970s,
when the guest worker program ended and it became clear that migrants were
there to stay. A “minority policy” was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
close to the idea of Dutch multiculturalism described by Koopmans (2005) and
Joppke (2007). Even though the minority policy was the reflection of a pragmat-
ic approach rather than the political and institutional expression of “normative
multiculturalism,” it was nonetheless based on the idea that, in order to optimize
migrants’ socioeconomic integration, the country needed to promote their socio-
cultural identities. 
This minority policy, however, lasted less than a decade. Starting in the early
1990s, Dutch integration policies were reformulated to focus on the participation
of immigrants and their children in the labor market and on individual equality against
the backdrop of a crisis of the welfare state. The categories allochtoon (those with
at least one parent born abroad) and autochtoon (those born to Dutch-born parents)
were adopted to distinguish non-Western migrants from the native Dutch. This was
also a time when concerns about Islam as generating integration problems became a
central political issue and were taken up by the liberal parliamentary leader Frits
Bolkestein from 1991 onward. In the early twenty-first century, integration poli-
cies changed, with the advent of an assimilationist approach that ended up mak-
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2 The following paragraphs on the Dutch case are directly inspired by Duyvendak and Scholten (2009).
ing the previous concept of Dutch multiculturalism a model of the past, and an
anti-model in the present. 
This account of variations in Dutch integration policies challenges the per-
ception that multiculturalism has been an unequivocal model in the Netherlands,
a question sharply debated by Dutch scholars nowadays. Thus, the significant issue
is not which normative type of multiculturalism could have produced the “Dutch
model,” but rather understanding why, despite repeated reversals in the way
Dutch policies and integration politics were publicly conceptualized, the Nether -
lands is said to have a multicultural model, although that “model” was applied
for barely a decade and was actually abandoned 20 years ago (Duyvendak and
Scholten 2009).
Finding a multicultural model in Britain is no easy task either. The very idea
of a stylized public philosophy of integration is even more difficult to grasp than in
the Netherlands. The reason is that British policymakers and collective minority actors
have mostly opted for a pragmatic approach to integration, rather than for a sophis-
ticated normative model like in France (Joly 2007; Garbaye 2005; com pare Favell
1998). In this context, the work done today by the most influential British scholars
on this issue may in fact be seen as an attempt to move away from this traditional
pragmatic approach and to promote a public normative conception of multicul-
turalism (i.e., Modood 2005; Parekh 2000). 
In any case, before what is currently referred to as a multicultural model, po l -
icies of assimilation were the norm in Britain. It was only in the 1960s that pub-
lic debates focused on the dilemma of a liberal citizenship fraught with racial dis-
crimination (Rose and Deakin 1969). The new Commonwealth migrants from the
Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, who dominated the migrant flow to
Britain in the 1950s and early 1960s, were then British citizens on arrival. This had a
direct impact on how public debates about immigration were framed. The public
issue of integration was framed by two objectives, namely the fight against discri m -
ination and the promotion of good relations among the various groups in Britain
(Bleich 2003). The categories used to define these groups were racial in the begin -
ning, with ethnicity becoming more important in the 1980s. Since the late 1990s,
these categories have been reformulated in the country, and religion is now a cen-
tral one. In 2001, the census included a question about religious identity for the
first time. Interfaith dialogue is now a significant tool of public interventions on
questions of integration, and one of the major topics of debate is the demand by
Muslim groups for the recognition of religious categories in anti-discrimination
legislation. In summary, the British “multicultural crisis” is only a discursive strategy
that serves as a proxy for a new wave of changes in the frameworks defining pub-
lic debates and public interventions on integration.
Finally, a comparable analysis can be done regarding the republican model in
France. Ever since the question of immigrant minorities’ integration emerged on
the political agenda in the mid-1980s, there have been at least four normative con -
ceptualizations of the French model. Each of these sees integration and the corres -
ponding public response in a specific way that clashes with the three others (Bertossi
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2009):  the groups labeled as “immigrants” are never defined in the same way;3
the origin of the challenge posed to the republican concept of common belonging
is never perceived as being the same; behind the constant call for “tradition” and
the “principles of the Republic” (Feldblum 1999), the public response is always
different and always clashes with the historical republican foundation.
A first “normative republic” conception held sway in the mid-1980s with the
end of the myth of the return of immigrants to their countries of origin: immi-
grants had become part of French society (see Sayad 1999). At the same time, the
National Front, France’s extreme right-wing party, began to take on weight in the
public debate, achieving its first electoral successes in local (1983), European (1984),
and national (1986) elections. The public issue of the integration of immigrant
minorities was defined in terms of loyalty (the Français de papiers or “identity-card-
citizens”), allegiance (the issue of mandatory military service for individuals with dual
nationalities) (Bertossi 2001), and, soon thereafter, religion (with the first headscarf
affair in 1989) (Kepel 1987). After several attempts, the Law of 1993 set new con-
ditions for access to citizenship, requiring a manifestation de volonté (an explicit
request) and thereby eliminating the century-old tradition of automatic access to cit-
izenship for those born in France (Weil 2002).
This first conceptualization of the republican model was replaced at the end
of the 1990s by a new normative program based on the “French invention of dis-
crimination” (Fassin 2002), which drastically changed the integration debate. The
notion of formal equality (having French citizenship) became secondary to a sub-
stantive definition of equality (having French citizenship and not being discrimi-
nated against) (Conseil d’État 1997). The issue was no longer one of foreigners
wanting to become French citizens, but of French citizens needing to be provided
with equal opportunities by French society and institutions.
Soon afterwards, the public conceptualization of republican principles evolved
toward a third normative republic that denounced the anti-discriminatory element as
a “purely moral approach” unsuitable for confronting “a stream of converging indices
reflected in various forms of identity-related movements and tensions” (Haut Conseil
à l’Intégration 2006, 17). In the early 2000s, the secular republic appeared as the new
yardstick in the integration debate. However, far from being defined in the terms
of the 1905 law, the founding law on laïcité, secularism became a moral framework
that defined identity and was linked to new debates on gender equality, sexuality,
and the “deviance” of immigrant family structures (e.g., accusations of polygamy and
machismo or concerns about overcrowded households in immigrant neighborhoods).
The public response to this evolution is summed up in the Law of March 15, 2004,
which disallowed “conspicuous religious signs” in public schools and imposed the
posting of a “secularism charter” in the hallways of public buildings, namely hos-
pitals (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2007).
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3 The term “immigrant” is used in public discourse and debates in France to refer to people who are
not immigrants at all, but French-born children and grandchildren of immigrants.
It seems to me that a fourth normative republic is in the making. Behind the
conspicuous secular dimension of the current debate about banning the burka in
public places, which affects fewer than 2 000 women, something else appears to
mark a new stage in the republican framework. Current debates about integration,
and in particular the integration of Muslim groups, are no longer enclosed with-
in the limits of abstract universalism, but are part of a “civilizational program,”
which Nicholas Sarkozy explicitly described in a November 12, 2009, speech on
integration and French national identity. Sarkozy’s remarks heralded the return of
a notion that had been explicitly abandoned by the republican integration model
since the 1980s: assimilation is now supported by the notion of “immaterial public
order” (meaning that sociocultural integration is a matter of public order and se -
curity) (Conseil d’État 2010). 
This discussion of the four notions of the republic raises a key question: Which
conceptualization are we using when we discuss the republican model? Is it the
republic of nationality, anti-discrimination, secularism, or the republic of moral
assimilation and public order? These four frameworks lead to different and mutually
contradictory diagnoses of existing social problems, and give rise to different nor-
mative programs.
This brief comparison of the Netherlands, Britain, and France shows the lim-
its of the idea of an unequivocal integration model prevailing in each country. It
also repositions the “crisis of models” discourse beyond a before-and-after percep -
tion of a glorious past that has given way to the current decline. This reposition-
ing allows us to rid ourselves of the idea of normative blocks being put to the test
of multicultural and Muslim claims or nationalist reaction since the early twenty-
first century. These highly stylized national models, as we often imagine them, have
never existed, not because of the contradictions or the gap between their precepts
and observable reality, but for the simple reason that they were never institution-
alized or internalized on the basis of stable, univocal, and coherent normative systems
over the last 30 years.
Finding the Models: Five Working Propositions
So, we come back to my original question: Do national models provide either a partial
or a complete explanation of reality as empirically observed by field researchers?
What can national integration models teach us about the practices of those who
speak about the French Republic, multiculturalism, integration, and ethnicity? It
is not enough to show, as I have done, the problems with concepts like national inte-
gration models. The fact that these models are not institutionally consistent, nor-
matively coherent, culturally defined, or historically stable does not mean that they
are simply figments of the imagination of researchers engaged in ideological debates
on immigrants’ integration.
Models are not an illusion created by public or political debates. This is the
most important element of my argument: when trying to address issues such as
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the integration of migrants and citizenship in a context of diversity, we are con-
fronted with a wide range of social actors (including scholars) who believe in the
existence of these models and use them to justify strategic choices and their own
practices.
It is not enough to conclude that national models do not exist, because the
reality scholars observe is, in fact, saturated with “modelized” thoughts and “mod-
elizing” practices. The subjects of our research (social actors) believe in the exis-
tence of a French model built on principles inherited from the French Revolution
or in the existence of a Dutch and a British multiculturalism. Models are dis-
cussed everywhere: in working-class pubs, hospital hallways, at the desks of fam-
ily allowance organizations, in police stations, in school staff rooms, in union or
NGO meetings, in the reader commentary sections of newspaper websites, in sum-
mits of European ministers of the interior, to name just a few.
It is therefore wrong to say that national models of integration should not be
taken seriously because many people do take these models very seriously. The model
concepts are used, imagined, negotiated, affirmed, contested, and challenged by
different types of people. Models should not be studied as if they exist in a stable
and consistent normative, cultural, historical, and institutional context. It is critical
to be aware of the diverse uses of models and the negotiations, discussions —and
misunderstandings— in which they play a role. The cognitive turn in the social
science literature on ethnicity, which conceptualizes “ethnicity, race, and nation as
perspectives on the world rather than entities in the world” (Brubaker et al. 2004, 31),
is therefore a promising perspective for repositioning the notion of national inte-
gration models (see also Weber 1991, 58-59; Schütz 1982). This perspective helps
avoid a positivist approach that often reduces questions about national models to
questions about “how institutions think” (Douglas 1986) and how members of a
society are configured in idealistic structures and shaped by societal institutions.
The perspective helps place social actors’ agency front and center, removing it
from behind the screen of official and formal narratives of nations’ cultural self-
understandings.  
Models are not the a priori resource for action or an ex ante normative frame-
work through which actors give shape to their strategies. Instead, these strategies
give shape to varying, polysemic, and contradictory models. Models do not impose
on social actors ready-made ways for deciding what to do and how to do it. A wide
range of social actors contribute to the construction of national models through the
definition of agendas, specific problematization of issues at stake, the understanding
of situations, categorization of social groups, and moral entrepreneurship (Becker
1963), to which they attribute substantial content (e.g., a normative value system,
a matrix of justification, typified categories within the sense of a social hierarchy,
a moral judgment) (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Lamont 2002; Bowen 2009).
If we take models as cognition, involving more than merely the policymaking
community and telling much more than a mere univocal official narrative about
how nations define their self-identity, we no longer conceive of them as an inde-
pendent but as a dependent variable. This way, we can avoid two major drawbacks:
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we can free ourselves from a totalizing and non-reflexive use of models (i.e., repu b -
licanism or multiculturalism as fully explaining citizenship in France, the Nether -
lands, and Britain) and steer clear of overly dismissive conceptions of models (i.e.,
they count for nothing at all). In other words, French republicanism, British and
Dutch multiculturalism, or other national stylized conceptions of citizenship can-
not be held up as objective entities. They cannot be turned into the explanatory
framework for the differences that exist among national contexts. Rather, they
work as what I call “cognitive vanishing-points.” These points are used as struc-
tures of reference in various contexts to frame the questions of identity, of com-
mon belonging, and of inclusion and exclusion. However, this framing activity is
not monopolized by one social group (policymakers or national elites) and does
not produce univocal, coherent, and homogeneous normative entities. Five inter-
related working propositions about national models summarize the argument I
have laid out here:
• Far from being homogeneous blocks, national models are constantly con-
tradicted by social, political, and institutional practices. Contradictions are
part of these models and can represent exogenous divergences —the pre-
cepts of a model are contradicted by public policies in certain sectors— or
endogenous divergences —contradictory principles may be claimed in the
name of the same model.
• Models are not stable and allow varying problematizations across time. To
speak of republicanism as the French model or multiculturalism in Britain
or the Netherlands leaves much to be said about the stark differences that
characterize public discussions on the integration of migrants and the project
of equality and inclusion of diversity within the existing national context.
• Models are not an a priori normative matrix but an a posteriori problemati-
zation. French universalism, Dutch tolerance, or British racial equality are
not the starting point but the temporary outcome of public discussions. Models
are the result of chaotic negotiations on the meaning of “the integra tion
problem” and its solution. Debates about models are aimed at imposing a
dominant framework, which is never given before the discussion reaches a
very provisional stage. To speak of republicanism, multiculturalism, and the
crisis of European national models is part of the attempt to impose a dom-
inant frame in public discussion.
• Models are not absolute but polysemic expressions. Thus, they offer a stra -
tegic ambiguity (Eisenberg 1984; Leitch and Davenport 2007) that makes
them easily manipulated by different actors who seek different outcomes
from the discussion. If scholars refer in their analyses to French republi-
canism or Dutch and British multiculturalism, so do journalists, politicians,
immigrant associations, and other actors. However, the content that each
attaches to these or other similar concepts (secularism, pillarization, state
neutrality, integration, etc.) is very often different. They may seem to be dis -
cussing the same issues, but behind the seeming linguistic stability of these
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concepts, people attribute widely different, even opposite, normative con-
notations to the models. What do assertions such as “France is republican,”
“republican principles require the banning of the burka,” or “because France
is republican, we cannot use ethnic statistics” have in common? Each use
of the word “republic” has different implications (a political regime with a
constitution, a moral judgment about religious freedom, a statement about the
consequence of an ideology for research). The closely-knit interrelationship
among these different dimensions cannot be taken as a given —are they
really part of a consistent and integrated single scheme?— but must be ex -
plained (how each belongs to different schemes and affects the others). Not
only are contradictions an inherent feature of models (the first proposition), but
the model-constructing process involves a variety of “spheres of justice” or
“worlds of justification” (Walzer 1983; Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Bowen
2009; Schütz 1982). The possible discrepancy between one sphere and
another may lead to misunderstandings by concerned actors, which, in turn,
reinforces the contradictions I already mentioned. For instance, the principle
of gender equality may be used to try to liberate those viewed as being op -
pressed (for example, women wearing the niqab and seen as dominated by
husbands or brothers) and, at the same time, deprive these same women of
their status as citizens (by refusing them access to nationality because they
wear the niqab). In the Netherlands, tolerance (toward same sex couples, for
instance) may be used as a basis for intolerant discourse (against Muslim pop-
ulations, for example).
• While they lack any stable normative content, models represent a performa -
tive practice (Austin 1962). This type of practice produces additional meaning
in routine social relations between actors who share a belief in a normatively
consistent and coherent social and political world but attribute very different
meanings to this fact (proposition 4). Behind the various uses, contradictory
practices, disagreements regarding future action, disputes on the normative
approach of what the integration of migrants ought to be, or on citizenship
in a context of cultural, religious, ethnic or racial diversity, actors in fact dis-
cuss the contradictions, drifting, and limitations of the models without ever
doubting their existence. These discussions routinize the idea that France
is undeniably republican or that Britain and the Netherlands are multicul-
tural, the effects of which are real, including the institutionalization of the
narrative. This performative effect should not only be explored in the realm
of official institutions and policies, but also in the cognitive construction of
social reality, in which all the segments that make up a society participate. 
Conclusion
My aim in this article has not been to propose a new theory of the notion of na -
tional integration models. Instead, I have argued that models of integration are an
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inappropriate tool for the comparative study of integration inasmuch as the objec-
tive of that research is to assess the success or failure of a national approach to
integrating migrants and minority groups. I have shown that the notion of nation-
al models is polluted by normative (if not moral) connotations that hinder social
scientists’ ability to address empirical reality.
If models tend to be taken as a substitute for reality and distort research
strategies, we should not discard them entirely. The five working propositions I
have presented suggest a way forward to shift research on national models. A con-
siderable amount of energy has been expended in trying to extract a complex social
reality from national integration models, with the risk of caricaturing the world that
we study by using extremely attractive, but limited, narratives. It seems to me that it
is time for us to move backward, so to speak, inducing models from reality and
conceiving of them as fluctuating dependent variables that must be explained. If
we really want to understand the injustices of our societies, I believe that we need
to study the actors who develop a multiplicity of conceptions of equality, inclusion,
and identity, and understand from a sociological perspective how national models
of integration play a role in these developments.
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